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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY J. SHELMIDINE, et. al. : 
Plaintiff s-Respondents 
CHARLENE POLLY COOK, : 
Interwenor : 
vs. 
CHARLES A. JONES, et. a l . , : Case No. 14152 
Defendants-Appellants. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS - CROSS APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF 
THE CASE 
The appellants, Justices of the Peace of Precincts in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, appeal from the action of the District Court, Third Judicial 
District, granting respondents, defendants charged with criminal offenses, 
an extraordinary writ in the nature of prohibition precluding the appellants 
as non-lawyer justices of the peace from imposing imprisonment or jail 
sentences on conviction of a criminal offense otherwise within their 
jurisdiction. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The respondents filed a petition for an extraordinary writ in the 
nature of prohibition in the District Court, Third Judicial District, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, against the appellants. The respondents sought 
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a final order prohibiting any of the appellants from presiding over a 
criminal trial where a jail sentence may be imposed absent a waiver from 
the respondents. An answer was entered by the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office for the appellants in their official capacity and 
thereafter an entry of appearance was filed by Robert D. Moore, as 
attorney for the appellants personally. The action was originally filed 
as a class action and application was made to have the matter certified as a 
class action. The court on the 21st day of May, 1975, denied certification 
of the matter as a class action and thereafter the case was submitted 
on each party's motion for summary judgment. A motion to intervene 
on behalf of Charlene Polly Cook was subsequently filed and granted. 
The trial court entered a memorandum decision on the 3rd day of 
June, 1975, and an extraordinary writ was thereafter entered prohibiting 
the appellants from imposing jail sentences or imprisonment on the respon-
dents in the event the respondents were convicted of the charges pending 
against them. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL AND CROSS APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the District Court's order granting 
a writ in the nature of prohibition and remand of the case for further 
proceedings on the charges filed against respondents. Respondents pursuant 
to their duly filed cross appeal under Rules 74 and 75 d of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure seek an order directing that the writ in the nature of 
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prohibition be entered as originally prayed for in respondent's original 
• ' • . . • • • • • • ' . ' ' ' I 
complaint. Specifically on cross-appeal respondents requests a writ 
in the nature of prohibition preventing appellant lay-justices from 
hearing any criminal cases involving charges in which a jail sentence 
may be the ultimate result. 
Alternatively respondent's ask for an order affirming the District 
Court's memorandum decision and an order granting a writ in the nature of 
prohibition which prevents the appellant lay justices from imposing 
imprisonment or a jail sentence upon a conviction of an offense overwfrtfch 
they otherwise have jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents stand charged with the crime of driving under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor, Section 41-6-44 Utah Code Annotated (1953 * 
as amended!). Respondent Larry J. Shelmidine's case was set for trial 
before appellant Charles A. Jones on January 16, 1975. Respondent John 
R. Reeves' case was set for trial before Lynn D. Bernard on March 25, 
1975. Respondent Charlene P. Cook's case was set for trial before 
Charles A. Jones on April 10, 1975. The penalty involved if respondents 
are found guilty is imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor 
more that six months, or by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than 
$299, or hy both such fine and imprisonment. Section 41-6-44 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). Trials for all respondents were stayed pending the 
outcome of this case. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Respondents sought a petition for an extraordinary writ in the nature 
of prohibition forbiding appellants from hearing criminal cases where 
imposition of imprisonment or a jail sentence was possible. 
At the time of the hearing on motion for summary judgement, it 
was stipulated that none of the appellants were a member of the Bar of the 
State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
In this case as originally filed in the District Court, respondent's 
sought extraordinary relief in the nature of prohibition permanently prohibiting 
the appellant lay justices from presiding over any criminal case where a jail 
sentence may be imposed absenttherequisite waiver. The District Court 
modified the relief sought by respondents ruling only that appellants could 
not impose any imprisonment or jail sentence, but could in effect continue 
to hear criminal cases where a jail sentence might result as long as 
appellant's did not in fact impose such a sentence. Respondents respectfully 
submit, pursuant to the cross appeal heretofore taken under Rules 74 
and 75 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the District Court's 
order should be modified to allow for the relief originally prayed and that 
this Court should prohibit the appellant lay justices from hearing any 
criminal case where a jail sentence might result. Such a ruling would 
bring the decision within the meaning of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 
25 (1972) thus granting respondents original prayer for relief. 
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Alternatively respondent's ask affirmance of the District 
Court's ruling and order granting the writ in the nature of prohibition. 
POINTI 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES REQUIRES THAT A JUDGE IN A CRIMINAL 
CASE IN WHICH A JAIL SENTENCE MAY BE IMPOSED 
BE A LAWYER. 
Respondent's submit that the practice of allowing the 
appellants to preside over criminal cases wherein a jail sentence may be 
imposed is a denial of a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial and thus, is 
in violation of Due Process of Law as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
The right to a fair trial is protected by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Lay Justice of the Peace system in Salt 
Lake County is fraught with arbitrary justice resulting in a denial of due 
process. Lay judges in Salt Lake County have jurisdiction over many 
complex matters that directly affect the liberty of the accused, and their 
jurisdiction results in a denial of due process of law that cannot be remedied 
by according the accused the right to appeal. 
The U. S. Supreme Court has held that all defendants are entitled to 
a fair trial, Adamson vs. California, 332 U. S. 46, reh. den. 332 U. S. 784 
(1947); Tumey v,Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927). While the Fourteenth Amendment 
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is not a guarantee that a trial shall be devoid of error, if the error is 
gross and obvious, coming close to the boundary of arbitrary action, 
there is a violation of due process, Roberts v. New York City, 295 U. S. 
264 (1934). Due process further requires that different criminal procedure 
in the several states nevertheless should be subject to the overriding 
requirements of fundamental fairness implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655 (1961). No matter how well-
meaning a lay judge may be, there are compelling reasons why he should not 
be permitted to perform judicial functions in proceedings which affect 
the liberty of the accused. 
The Supreme Court of California has recently held, in the case 
of Gordon v. Justice Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 12 Cal. 12 Cal. 3d 
323, 525 P. 2d 72 (1974), cert. den. 43 L. Ed. 2d 415 (Feb. 18, 1975) 
that the use of non-lawyer judges in criminal cases where a jail sentence may 
r esult is a patent .denial of due process of law. 
The court in that case held: 
. . . we conclude that, under today's advanced standards, due 
process demands that henceforth a defendant charged with an 
offense carrying a possible jail sentence must be provided 
with an attorney judge to preside over the proceedings, unless 
he elects to waive such right. (525 P. 2d at 79) 
Gordon and Arguijo, the defendants in that case, were brought 
before different non-attorney justice court judges to stand trial for 
misdemeanors, punishable with a possible jail sentence. Gordon was 
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charged with distrubing the peace and failure to disperse and Arguijo 
with driving under the influence of alcohol. The California Supreme 
Court, in bank, unanimously held that due to the lack of legal training 
"a reasonable likelihood exists that a non-attorney judge will be unable to 
afford a defendant a fair trial. " (525 P. 2d at 79). 
An analysis of the California Court's opinion in Gordon demands 
a determination that the use of lay judges in the justice of the peace courts 
of Salt Lake County suffers the same constitutional infirmities as the 
California system. 
Justices of the Peace in Utah have criminal jurisdiction over 
several specified misdemeanors and all misdemeanors punishable by 
up to a Three Hundred Dollar ($300.00) fine or six (6) months 
in prison or both, Section 78-5-4 Utah Code Annotated (1953). The 
jurisdiction of the California justice courts, struck dcwn Gordon, was 
very similar (See 525 P. 2d at 74). At the outset of that case the California 
Court stated that no distinction of constitutional dimension could be made 
solely on the fact that the justice court's deal exclusively with misdemeanor 
cases. In this regard it was noted that the constitutional and legal issues 
involved in a misdemeanor case: 
. . . may be as complex a those involved in a trial of a more 
serious offense. (See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33, 
92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530). There is little guarantee 
that the background of a non-attorney judge will have prepared 
him to recognize these issues and resolve them according to 
established legal principles. (525 P. 2d at 76). 
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While noting the the breadth of the recent development of constitutionally 
mandated criminal procedure, the court further opined that such functions 
as charging the jury, taking guilty pleas, making difficult sentencing 
decisions, and ruling on difficult constitutional and evidentiary issues 
demands highly developed legal skill and training and may not be performed 
by one not trained in the law (525 P. 2d at 72). Interestingly the court 
noted that ruling on the complex evidentiary issues surrounding the admini-
stering of various blood alcohol tests in driving under the influence cases 
is one instance where the non-attorney judge is not going to be able to 
perform satisfactorily. The respondents in the instant case, all charged 
with driving under the influence, thus face the same quandry as that which 
the California Court found so telling in making their decision. 
The California Court found support for its landmark ruling in the 
dynamic quality of the concept of Due Process of law. Quoting at length from 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 
(1949) Justice Burke speaking for the unanimous court went on to say: 
Whatever the justification for permitting laymen to preside over 
criminal trials in the 1800's, it is well recognized that even 
•
:f long-standing practices must meet the advancing standards 
of due process. (525 P. 2d at 75). 
The court then noted that the United States Supreme Court's 
landmark right to counsel decisions of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 
335, (1963) and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, (1972), recognized 
that the complexities involved in defending oneself in a criminal trial are 
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beyond the capabilities of the average layman untrained in the laws 
regardless of the severity of the penalty. Taking the next step the California 
court said: 
. . . it logically follows that the failure to provide a judge 
qualified to comprehend and utilize counsel's legal arguments 
likewise must be considered a denial of due process. (525 P. 
2d at 78). 
Thus, the decision by the California Supreme Court sets forth a 
definitive ruling that the due process of law embodied in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution finds the use of n on-lawyer 
judges in criminal trials where jail-time may result, constitutionally 
impermissible. Those few other cases which have dealt with this specific 
issue are not so definitive and are readily distinguishable, as was noted 
by the California Court. (525 P. 2d at 78). 
Three of these cases, City of Decatur v. Kushner, 43 111. 2d 
334, 253, N. E. 2d 425 (1969); Crouch v. Justice Court, 7 Ariz. App. 460, 
440 P. 2d 1000 (1969) and Melkean v. Avent, 300 F. Supp 516 (D. C. N. D. 
Miss. 1969) are pre-Argersinger v. Hamlin decisions. The precedential 
value of these cases is therefore of limited validity considering the 
California Court's and Judge Hanson's heavy reliance on the Argersinger 
rationale for their decisions. Furthermore, in none of these cases is the 
issue extant in the instant case really thoroughly discussed. In City of 
Decatur v. Kushner the issue seems to have been raised by counsel as 
an afterthought and for the first time on appeal. The Supreme Court of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Illinois casually dismissed the constitutional issue with citations only to 
Am. J r . , C. J. S. and state stautory and constitutional provisions. 
In Crouch v. Justice Court the intermediate appellate court in 
Arizona dealt solely with the issue of whether allowing a justice of the 
peace to instruct the jury as to the law in a criminal misdemeanor case 
is a denial of due process. The court in Crouch similarly did not reach 
the precise issue at the bar today. 
Melkeanv. Avent, 300 F. Supp. 516(D.C.N.D. Miss. 1969) 
is even less in point. This pre-Argersinger decision embodied an action 
in Federal Court to have the entire Mississippi Justice of the Peace Court 
System declared unconstitutional. Importantly, however, the action in 
the justice court upon which the plaintiff asked for injuctive relief in 
Federal Court was a civil suit sounding in contract, and not a criminal 
action. The issue as to whether a non-lawyer judge may constitutionally 
preside over a criminal trial where a jail sentence may result was not 
even discussed peripherally. 
The other authority asserted in the briefs of appellants is likewise 
of little relevance being pre-Argersinger. Moreover, like State ex rel Swann 
v. Freshour, 219 Tenn 482, 410 S. W. 2d 885 (1967)nons of the cases deal with 
the issue of the use of lay judges in the context of a criminal trial where 
a jail sentence may result or has been imposed. That is the issue in the 
instant case, contrary to the assertions of appellants this not an attempt on 
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the part of respondents to overthrow the entire justice of the peace system 
in Utah or ring the death knell of that system. 
Appellant's rely heavily on the case of Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 
407 U. S. 345 (1972) for the proposition that a lay judge is per se qualified 
to preside at a criminal trial where jail time may result. Shadwick, 
however, as is noted in the brief's submitted by the appellants (Brief of 
Salt Lake County Attorney at 12 and Brief of Appellants -Utah Attorney 
General at 9) decided only that a non-lawyer, non-judicial clerk was 
capable of determining probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant. 
The issue before the Court in the instant case is not even alluded to, and 
was not before the United States Supreme Court in Shadwick. 
Respondents have no quarrel with the limited rule announced in that 
case. Shadwick only reaffirms the long standing use of layman, particularly 
police officers, to make a probable cause determination for arrest. See 
for example Section 77-13-3 Utah Code Annotated (1953). Moreover, the 
Court in Shadwick expressly noted that the lay-clerk issuing such warrants 
would be under the close scrutiny of a judicial officer and furthermore 
limited the holding to the issuance of arrest warrants. The Court was 
not willing to go the next step and decide whether a lay-clerk could 
issue search warrants where the intrusion into the sanctity of home and office 
might be great: and the concommitant legal issues more complex. 
The only real authority which may be found in opposition to the 
California Court's decision in Gordon and Judge Hanson's decision below 
is a series of decisions from the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Ditty v. Hampton Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ky., 490 S. W. 2d 772 (1972) app. dism. 414 U. S. 885 (1973); and North v. 
Russell, Ky. , 516 S. W. 2d 103 (1974) vac. and rem. 95 S. Ct. 673 (1974)1. 
Ditty v. Hampton is the benchmark in Kentucky and the Court therein ruled, 
post -Argersinger, that due process does not require that the court in a 
criminal case be presided over by a lawyer judge. The conclusion of that 
court is best embodied in the following statement: 
. . . we think it is clear, accepting due process as a living 
principle, that advancing standards or changing conditions have 
not yet made the lawyer judge a condition of fundamental fairness. 
(490 S. W. 2d at 772). (Emphasis Supplied). 
The California Court, specifically citing Etttty v. Hampton, 
unequivocably disagreed: 
The people point out that the courts of several states have 
concluded that the use of non-attorney judges is consistant 
with the demands of due process . . . [citing Ditty v. Hampton 
Crouch v. Justice of the Peace Court and City of Decatur v. 
Kushner,] . . . yet, none of these cases convincingly resolved 
the inherent inconsistancy in guaranteeing a defendant an attorney 
to represent him without providing for an attorney judge to preside 
at the proceedings. As we have seen a defendant's right to a fair 
trial may be substantially abridged by the use of a non-attorney 
judge. Gordon v. Justice Court, supra, 525 P. 2d at 78. 
1. The United States Supreme Court has again recently decided to hear 
the case of North v. Russell, 17 Cr. L. 4093 (6-23-75) having rioted 
probable jurisdiction for appeal once again, and having accepted Briefs 
on the following issue: 
Are Kentucky statutes that subject defendant to trial and 
potential imprisonment in court presided over by a 
non lawyer judge invalid under the Fifth, Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments? 
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Furthermore, Ditty v. Hampton dealt with the issue of whether 
a non attorney police judge could constitutionally preside over ,Tany criminal 
t r i a r or exercise nany jurisdiction in any criminal proceedings. " (490 
S. W. 2d at 773). Thus, the specific issue in the instant case of non-
attorney judges exercising jurisdiction over criminal cases where a jail 
2 
sentence might result was dealt with only collaterally, if at all. 
In the instant case the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, has followed the rationale of 
the California Court in Gordon in ruling on the constitutionality of the 
Utah's Justice of the Peace System. 
Respondents submit, that the California Court in Gordon, and the 
•i' . f. 
District Court speaking through Judge Hanson below state the better reasoned 
rule and that Due Process of Law requires an attorney judge to preside 
over any criminal case where a jail sentence may be the result of a 
conviction. 
The legislative trend in the United States also supports this point. 
An increasing number of jurisdictions are abandoning lay judge systems. 
At the present time, the laws of 15 jurisdictions exclude lay judges 
from hearing cases in which the defendant is charged with a crime 
punishable by imprisonment: Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, 
Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, 
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont and Wyoming. Of these 15 
2. It might be noted parenthetically that the Circuit Court Judge in Kentucky 
*m*A i-v,o noo rvf nrm-at-mrnw nnlir.fi pourt iudsres in criminal cases a denial 
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jurisdictions, moreover, 11 have also precluded lay judges from presiding 
over preliminary hearings and issuing search and arrest warrants. These 
facts indicate a significant trend toward the abolition of lay judge jur is-
diction over criminal matters in the various states. 
A model for the states was provided by the Federal Magistrates 
Act, 28 U. S. C. Section 631 (1)(b)(1) (1968). That Act replaced Title 28, 
Chapter 43 of the United States Code which had provided for United States 
Commissioners who were not required to have legal training. The new 
law requires all full-time federal magistrates to be members of the bar. 
It was also the consensus of the 1971 National Conference on the Judiciary 
that, "judges should be full-time officials, professionally trained in the 
law and aware of its traditional values. " (Consensus Statement of the National 
, Conference on the Judiciary", 55 J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 29, at 30 (1971). 
More recently, the House of Delegates of the American Bar 
Association in February, 1974, adopted the report of the American Bar 
Association's Project on Standards for Court Organization entitled, 
"Court Organization". On Page 39, the Report observed that. 
"The quality of a court system is determined chiefly by the 
quality of its judges". 
At Section 1.21(a), Page 40, it is recommended: 
"(a) Personal and professional qualifications. All persons 
selected as judges should be of good moral character, emotionally 
stable and mature, in good physical health, patient, courteous, 
and capable of deliberation and decisiveness when required to act 
on their own reasoned judgment. They should have a broad 
general and legal education and should have been admitted to the 
bar. They should have had substantial experience in the practice, Digitized by the Howar  W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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administration, or teaching of law for a term of years commensurate 
with the judicial office to which they are appointed. (Emphasis 
Supplied).3 
The most recent legislative limitation on the use of non-lawyer 
judges is found in the recent revision of the statute found constitutionally 
wanting by Judge Hanson below. In response to the Utah District Court's 
decision in that case a Special Session of the Utah Legislature recently 
passed legislation which gives a defendant in a criminal case the right to 
be tried and sentenced by a judge who is a member of the Utah State Bar 
Association. This statute, which takes effect on September 2, 1975, 
clearly shows that the often alleged problems of travel, transportation, and 
lack of an adequate number of lawyers can be overcome, while providing 
lawyer judges for all criminally accused. It is often argued that in states 
such as Utah and Kentucky where there are few lawyers in many of the 
rural counties and long distances to travel to the various county seats 
where the District Courts sit, that requiring law trained judges for the 
criminally accused in all misdemeanor cases becomes an impossible task. 
House Bill No. 1 which amends Section 78-5-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
shows however that such arguments have little substance. This legislation 
provides that District Court Judges, who must be lawyers in Utah, may 
3. In accord with this recommendation see the report of the President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice where it 
is stated that "All justices should be required to be fully trained in the law 
and their duties and their line of competence should be maintained by 
continuing training. " (Emphasis Supplied) The Challange of Crime In a 
Free Society, United States Government Printing Office (1967), Chapter 5 
at 130. cf, A. B A. Standards Relating to the Administratfisir of a Criminal 
Justice, Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge, Introduction; 
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hear the cases as Justices of the Peace Pro Tempore or appoint a member 
of the Utah Bar to sit as a Justice of the Peace Pro Tempore in order to 
accord the criminally accused his right to a competent tribunal. This simple 
solution to the problem in Utah overcomes those commonly voiced objections 
to the alleged problems in mandating lawyer judges in our inferior courts. 
This simple but effective response by the Utah Legislature gives effect to 
the wisdom inherent in Judge Hanson's statement that: 
Modern transportation and communication have considerably 
alleviated much of the problem earlier encountered in effectuating 
a viable means of administering effective and speedy justice 
on the misdemeanor level. (Memorandum Decision at 3) 
And this is true even though, as Judge Hanson noted, of the 29 
Counties in Utah there are still eight counties with two or less resident 
attorneys and five counties with no resident attorney. 
POINT I 
A 
THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS BY REQUIRING TRIAL BEFORE 
A NON-LAWYER JUDGE IS NOT REMEDIED BY A TRIAL DE 
NOVO APPEAL 
Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution and Section 78-3-5 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) provide for de novo appeals from justice of 
the peace courts in Utah, as does Section 78-4-17 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953). 
The provisions of Utah law granting trial de novo on appeal are not 
an adequate substitute or remedy for a trial in the first instance before 
a law trained judge competent to rule on legal issues. In Ward v. Village 
of Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57, (1972), the Court ruled that petitioner 
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convicted of two traffic offenses and sentenced to a $50 fine on each offense 
was denied his right to be tried by a disinterested and impartial judge as 
guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment due process where the trial took 
place before a village mayor empowered by Ohio statute to sit as Judge. 
The Court based its conclusion on the fact that the fines and forfeitures 
imposed by the mayor as judge went to the village treasury and constituted 
a major portion of village funds. The respondent argued that any error 
in the trial before the mayor was cured by the availability of trial de 
novo on appeal. The Court specifically rejected this contention. 
Respondent also argues that any unfairness at the trial level 
can be corrected on appeal and trial de novo in the County Court 
of Common Pleas. We disagree. This 'procedural safeguard1 
does not guarantee a fair trial in the mayor's court . . . Nor, 
in any event, may the State's trial court procedure be deemed 
constitutionally acceptable simply because the state eventually 
offers a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled 
to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance. 409 U. S. at 
61-62. (Emphasis Supplied). 
The appellant's rely on Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972) 
for the proposition that this right to a trial de novo in the District Court 
somehow clears up any constitutional infirmities in the use of non-attorney 
justices of the peace. Appellants read Colten for more than it is worth. 
Colten was basically concerned with whether or not on a trial de novo 
appeal from a justice court to a superior court of general jurisdiction, 
the superior court could enhance the punishment given the defendant in the 
justice court. Specifically, the issue was whether the rule of North Carolina 
v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969) was applicable to de novo appeals. The issue 
in the instant case, whether or not a non-attorney judge can preside over Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a criminal case where a jail sentence might result, was not at issue. 
In point of fact, Coltenfs appeal was from the imposition of a fine of 
$10.00 and not a jail sentence. And, the court specifically noted that the 
trial judge in that Kentucky justice court was a lawyer. (407 U. S. at 
114 n. 11). The holding of the Court was expressly tied to the North 
Carolina v. Pearce issue: 
We cannot say that the Kentucky trial de novo system, as 
such, is unconstitutional or that it presents hazards 
warranting the restraints called for in North Carolina v. 
Pearce, . . . (407 U. S. at 119). (Cf. Marshall, J. in 
dissent 407 U.S. at 122-127). 
Interestingly, the Court in Colten conceded that the justice courts, 
in Kentucky at least, are incapable of according an accused his 
constitutional rights: 
. . . the inferior courts are not designed or equipped to 
conduct error-free trials, or to insure full recognition of 
constitutional freedoms. They are courts of convenience 
to provide speedy and inexpensive means of disposition of 
charges of minor offenses. (407 U. S. at 117). 
ColtenTs worth as precedent on the issue in the instant case must 
be limited to its facts, for as was noted in that case: 
4. One commentator has noted the inherent inconsistancy of the self-
serving argument that lay justice courts really exist to the advantage of 
the accused in that he gets a preview of the states case and is afforded 
a speedier trial. See Note, Increased Penalty Upon Trial de Novo, 
75 West Va. L. Rev. 372 (1972-1973) where the author notes that a 
justice of the peace system should be envisioned not merely as a 
mechanism of convenience and speedy conviction or acquittal, but 
as a court of law where justice is a foreseeable product. 
-18-
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Proceedings in the inferior courts are simple and speedy; and, 
if the results in Colten Ts case are any evidence, the penalty 
is not characteristically severe. (407 U.S. at 118). 
Respondents agree that to the extent a fine and not a jail sentence 
is imposed, then trial de novo review may cure any defect in the "simple 
and speedy" justice of a justicecoutts of convenience. However, where the 
threat of imprisonment exists, then the defendant must be accorded a 
trial before an attorney-judge as a matter of right, since at that point 
the potential harm to the accused outweighs any "convenience" factor. 
. Moreover, as indicated above, Ward v. Village of Monroeville 
firmly states the principle that trial de novo review is no talisman before 
which the constitutional infirmaties recognized by the Court in Colten 
in the inferior courts somehow vanish. The Constitution of the United 
States does demand a fair trial in the "first instance. " Or as stated by the 
United States Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Clark in Sheppard 
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363(1966). . 
. . . we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; -
the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the 
prejudice at its inception. . . 
In conclusion, the dynamic concept of Due Process of Law as 
employed in Gordon and reiterated by Judge Hanson below requires that the 
5. In Colten the Court noted that, following the trial in the Kentucky Circuit 
Court on appeal de novo, defendant had further appeals "in the same manner 
as a person tried initially in the general criminal court," 407 U. S. at 113. 
In Utah there is no appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from the district court 
decision except where the case involves the validity or constitutionality 
of a statute. Section 78-4-17 Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
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present system of allowing non-attorney judges to preside over criminal 
cases where a jail sentence may result be declared unconstitutional 
as violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States. 
POINT II 
THE PRACTICE OF HAVING NON -LAWYER JUDGES IN ALL 
PARTS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY AND LAWYER JUDGES IN SALT 
LAKE CITY ONLY, DEPRIVES RESPONDENTS WHO MUST BE 
TRIED BEFORE NON-LAWYER JUDGES, OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
OF THE LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF TFE UNITED STATES. 
Respondents claim that the practice of having non-lawyer judges 
in Salt Lake County with the exception of Salt Lake City where lawyer 
judges preside, deprives Respondents who must be tried before non-lawyer 
judges, the Equal Protection of the Laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah vests the judicial power of 
this state in the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment, and in a Supreme 
Court, district courts and in justices of the peace as well as any other 
inferior courts established by law. Art. VIII, Section 1. The State 
Constitution also requires that all judges of District Courts as well as 
all Supreme Court Justices be members of the bar in good standing and 
"learned in the law." Art. VIII, Sections 5 and 2. It is silent as to 
qualifications of the judges of the justice of the peace courts, and the 
legislature has never required justices of the peace to be members of the 
-20-
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bar or learned in the law. Section 78-5-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated 
(1953). Nor is this required by Section 17-16-5 Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
which establishes the election qualifications for justices of the peace. 
Unlike justices of the peace, however, in all first, second, third class 
cities or county seat cities which have a city judge pursuant to Section 
78-4-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953), that city judge must be a member of 
the bar in good standing and admitted to the practice of law. Sections 
78-4-4 and 78-4-8 Utah Code Annotated (1953). The criminal jurisdiction 
of city court judges where those offices exist, is the same as that of the 
justices of the peace under Section 78-4-16 Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
The only remote legal qualification required of justices of the peace 
is that they attend at least one of two institutes supervised by the Utah 
Supreme Court each year. Any justice of the peace who fails to so attend 
without the written excuse of the Chief-Justice of the Utah Supreme Court 
is required by statute to vacate his office. Section 78-5-27 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). As a result of the lack of legal training required of 
justices of the peace, of the eleven Justices of the Peace in Salt Lake County 
only one, who was not a party-defendant to the action below, is an 
attorney-judge. 
6. See 78-5-4 Utah Code Annotated (1953) as to criminal jurisdiction of 
justices of the peace. 
-21-
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This system results in a denial of equal protection to criminal 
defendants who, due to an accident of geography,happen to be charged 
with a crime in an outlying area of Salt Lake County as opposed to being 
charged within the confines of the jurisdiction of Salt Lake City Court 
vtfiich pursuant to Sections 78-4-4, and 78-4-8 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) has lawyer- judges, or within the jurisdiction of the one attorney-
judge in the Salt Lake County Justice of the Peace System. 
Although respondents herein distinguish between the classes of 
attorney and non-attorney judges, the real distinction is between one 
class of judges who have experienced three years of law school and then 
law practice, and the class of appellant judges who have not. The difference 
can accurately be characterized as that between trained and untrained 
persons, needless to say the difference between the two classes is graphic. 
The difference between the legal training and skill which must be 
demonstrated to obtain admission to the bar and the legal training and 
skill which must be demonstrated to qualify for the office of judge of the 
justice court is so substantial as to be beyond dispute. Qualifications and 
requirements for the admission to the practice of law in the State of Utah 
are stringent. Besides certain age and citizenship requirements, the bar 
applicant has the burden of showing his good moral character. Furthermore, 
admission to take the bar examination now requires Ma preliminary education 
other than legal1 f and the regular and attentive study of law for a period 
of thre£ years. Successful graduation, however, is not enough for Digitized by the Howard W. Hunte  Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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admission to practice. In addition, a candidate for bar admission must 
pass an intensive three-day written examination designed to test an 
applicant's ability to function under pressure as well as his 
substantive knowledge and analytical skill. With regard to criminal 
matters an applicant must demonstrate a basic understanding of the sub-
stantive criminal law and the procedureal protections embodied in the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution. See 
Section 78-51-10 Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
In contrast, no prior legal training, formal education, or prior 
business or professional experience of any kind is required for the office 
of Justice of the Peace. Persons who have never graduated from high school, 
much less law school, may be elected to that position. The sole requirement 
other than election, is participation in at least one supervised institute 
per year. Section 78-5 -27 Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
To suggest that the presence or absence of training in a judge 
makes no difference in the quality of justice would be patently absurd. To 
do so would imply that legal training and knowledge of the law is irrelevant 
to the process of legal decision making and to the exercise of judicial functions. 
The distinction involved in this action - except for one attorney 
justice of the peace in Salt Lake County who has actually studied law - is 
not one of subtle gradation along a continuum of legal learning. The 
distinction is between trained and untrained judges - between rule by law 
and rule by fiat. Dean Pound observed the importance of rule by law: 
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Administration of Justice According to Law has six advantages: 
(1) Law makes it possible to predict the course which the 
administration of justice will take; (2) Law secures against 
errors of individual judgment; (3) Law secures against 
improper motives on the part of those who administer justice; 
(4) Law provides "the magistrate with standards in which the 
ethical ideas of the community are formulated; (5) Law gives 
the magistrate the benefit of all the experience of his predecessors; 
(6) Law prevents sacrifice of ultimate interests, social and 
individual, to the more obvious and pressing but less weighty-
immediate interests. Pound, ''Justice According to Law, 
Essays on Jurisprudence from the Columbia Law Review, 
230 (1963) (Emphasis in Original) 
Dean Pound also observed the harmful consequences of rule by fiat: 
With no training in the law, no training in the process of judicial 
thought, and no mental habit of mind acquired by constant experience 
in legal reasoning, it would indeed be strange if a [lay judge] 
did not treat each case as a unique proposition. He has no 
category or class into which he may place it, no analogies from 
which to draw to solve the new problem before him. He has no 
legal rules, principles or standards by which to judge the merits 
of the controversy to be decided. Wholly unlike the judge who is 
trained in the law, he has no precedents to guide him. In deciding 
the cause before him, the lay judge is necessarily limited by his 
own personal experience acquired in the short span of a single 
lifetime. He cannot call on the legal experience of the ages to 
assist him but is helpless to any more than apply his own personal 
notions of right and wrong to the case at hand. The justice which 
such tribunal is capable of dispensing is but the outcropping 
of the experiences of a personality, often limited and warped by 
passion and prejudice, and at best, as variable as the personalities 
- •>* of the justices who comprise [the system]. . . Such justice is 
not justice at all. It is unequal, uncertain, and capricious. Smith, 
The Justice of the Peace System, 15 Cal. L. Rev.. 118, 127-128 
(1927) quoting from Pound, Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence, 
^^^•-•'75 (3rd Ed) -
The verdict of other legal commentators on the institution of 
untrained judges is equally severe. With the metamorphosis of criminal 
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law and procedure into a complex, sophisticated system governed increasingly 
by a myriad of statute and case law, the overwhelming weight of learned 
authority calls either for a drastic curtailment of lay judge jurisdiction 
7 
or for abolition of the system outright. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the distinction 
between attorney judges and lay magistrates having no legal training, 
and has noted that Munbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated 
is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure. " In Re Gault> 
387 U. S. 1, 18 (1967). The Court in Gault went out of its way to note the 
absence of judicial qualifications in many juvenile proceedings, including 
the non-attorney status of many juvenile judges. The court quoted with 
approval the observation that Mgood will, compassion and similar virtues 
are . . . admirably prevalent throughout the system,tf but that "expertise, 
the keystone of the whole venture, is lacking. " 387 U. S. at 14 n. 14. 
7. Vanlandingham, Decline of the Justice of the Peace, 12 Kan. L. Rev. 389 
(1964); Smith, The Justice of the Peace System, 12 Cal. L. Rev. 118 (1927) 
Jaeowitz, Education and Training of Justices of the Peace, 35 N. Y. S. B. J. 
61 (1963); Lee, The Emergence and Evolution of a Constitutional Right to a 
Fair Trial Before a Justice of the Peace, 20 Fed. B.J. Ill (1960); McDonald, 
An Arbitrary Note on the Connecticut Justice of the Peace, 35 Conn. B. J. 
411 (1961); Nordberg, Farewell to Illinois Justices of theTeace, 44 Chi. B. 
Rec. 469 (1963); Banyon, Justice Court on Trial, 37 Mich. S.B.J. 35 (1958) 
V?nderbilt, The Municipal Court in New Jersey, 10 Rut. L. Rev. 647 (1956) 
Karringer, The Court of the Justice of the Peace, 60 Dick. L. Rev. 55 (1955); 
Zimmerman, Justice of the Peace Courts, 21 Ore. L. Rev. 380 (1942). 
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In determining whether specified state action violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an initial determination 
must be made as to which standard of review is appropriate. In recent 
years, the United States Supreme Court has articulated two basic tests 
to be applied to equal protection cases. Under the traditional standard 
of review, a statute does not deny equal protection if any facts may be 
reasonably conceived to justify it. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 
471 (1970). Under this standard, the state action or classification would 
be upheld if a rational relationship can be shown for the classification, 
or difference in treatment accorded classes of individuals standing in 
the same or similar relationship to the state. 
The second and stricter standard of review, comes into use when 
there is a violation or penalization of a fundamental constitutionally 
protected right. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972). Under this 
standard the state must show a substantial and compelling reason for its 
classification or distinction between two classes standing in the same or 
similar relationship to the state. 
Whether or not respondents have a constitutional right to a lawyer 
judge as a matter of due process, the quality of justice which may be 
reasonably expected from a lay judge is sufficiently inferior to that expected 
from a lawyer judge and the interest involved sufficiently fundamental as to 
require justification by a compelling governmental interest to meet the 
requirement of the Equal Protection Qause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In Re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133 (1955V This issue was not decided in 
Gordon v. Justice Court, the court finding the due process claim dispositive 
of the case (525 P. 2d at 74 fn. 4). 
The classification under challenge goes directly to the right of 
a person to a fair trial. This right is so fundamental and so primary as 
to invoke the compelling state interest test to any statutory classification 
affecting it. The United States Supreme Court has frequently affirmed that 
a fair trial is "the most fundamental of all freedoms" Estes v. Texas, 
381 U. S. 532, 540 (1965), and that "a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process. " In Re Murchison, supra. If, as past 
judicial decisions make clear, the government must prove a compelling 
interest for its classifications affecting such things as the right to 
procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U. S. 535, 541(1942), state 
apportionment, Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), voting eligibility 
Carringtonv. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 (1965), freedom of association, Williams 
v. Rhodes 393 U. S. 23 (1968) free exercise of religion, Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U. S. 398, 406 (1963), public housing eligibility Cole v. Housing Authority 
of City of Newport, 312 F. Supp. 692 (D.C.R.I. 1970), hiring examinations, 
Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 306 F. Supp. 
1355, 1358 (D.C. Mass. 1969), and public education, Serrano v. driest, 
96 Cal. Rptr. 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971), it hardly remains to be argued that the 
same strict scrutiny must apply to the classification affecting the right to 
a fair and impartial trial by a competent judge. 
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Those cases which examine the rights of a criminally accused 
under the equal protection clause rather than the due process clause 
speak of "unreasoned distinctions' among classes of accused persons 
which the state may justify only by showing a strong countervailing interest. 
Note, for example, Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) which invalidated 
a New Jersey statute which denied a free transcript on appeal only to 
persons confined in state penal institutions; Mayer v. City of Chicago, 
404 U. S. 189 (1971) which invalidated a court rule permitting free trial 
transcripts in felony but not misdemeanor cases; and Groppi v. Wisconsin, 
400 U. S. 505, 507 -508 (1971) which invalidated a state statute which cate-
gorically prevented a change of venue in a criminal jury trial in misdemeanor 
cases, the apparent alternative basis of this holding is the impropriety 
of a distinction drawn between felony and misdemeanor trials. See also, 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, supra at 415. 
J u s t as Groppi struck down a state law "that categorically prevents a 
change of venue for a criminal jury trial, regardless of the extent of local 
prejudice against the defendant, on the sole ground that the charge against 
the defendant is labeled a misdemeanor, (400 U. S. at 508), so the scheme 
under scrutiny here is invalid to the extent that it categorically prevents a 
trial before an attorney-judge regardless of the complexity of defenses 
or the admitted unfamiliarity of the lay-judge with the issues before him 
solely on the ground that the charge against the accused is labeled a 
misdemeanor and, moreover, lies in a particular geographical location of 
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Salt Lake County. 
Furthermore, the felony-misdemeanor distinction does not permit 
a state to create differences in trial of the two classes of offenses. For 
example, the distinction does not permit infringement of the right to counsel. 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra; or of state rules providing for copies of a 
transcript on appeal, Mayer v. City of Chicago, supra. Indeed, the decisions 
do not permit any dilution of an accused's trial rights depending on the 
severity of the charge, when a jail sentence is a possible result of the charge. 
Geographical variations in the basic competence of a trial judge 
similarly cannot withstand constutional scrutiny. The interest of a person 
charged with a misdemeanor in obtaining a fair trial clearly is a "fundamental'' 
interest. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). This interest is invaded 
by a system which provides two classes of judges. The classification is 
executed solely according to an arbitrary geographic formula and by an 
impermissible felony-misdemeanor distinction. The State therefore must 
demonstrate a compelling interest in maintaining such a classification 
in order to uphold it. The State of Utah cannot do so in the instant case. 
What exists in Salt Lake County is a system which is sanctified 
by history alone but fails to meet the close scrutiny now required under 
the equal protection clause. That the history of the lay judge institution 
is itself a justification, and that it must pass constitutional muster by virtue 
of its tradition is no justification at all. It worked in the 18th Century, the 
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argument goes, and therefore it must work today. The sanctity of 
history, however, can no more shield Justices of the Peace from modern 
judicial requirements than it can shield a person who was authorized to 
practice surgery 100 years ago from the rigorous standards of modern 
medical practice. In fact, the genesis of the lay judge system as a matter 
of need in a bygone era compels even greater scrutiny according to 
modern standards, and must be found constitutionally impermissible 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States. 
POINT III 
THE PRACTICE OF HAVING NON-LAWYER JUDGES PRESIDE OVER 
CRIMINAL CASES IN WHICH A JAIL SENTENCE MAY RESULT 
PRESENTS A DEFACTO DEPRIVATION OF A CRIMINALLY 
ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH 
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES. 
The practice of having non-lawyer judges preside over criminal 
cases in which a jail sentence may be imposed, is a violation of a criminally 
accused's right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution in that non-lawyer judges 
cannot be assumed to have the ability to understand complex legal arguments. 
The practice of allowing lay judges to preside over criminal trials 
renders the Sixth Amendment right to counsel nugatory and constitutes a 
violation of due process of law. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 342 
(1963), and its companion case Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben l rk Law School  BYU. 
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the United States Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment right to the 
assistance of counsel applicable to the states by incorporation into the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Lay justices of the peace in Utah exercise criminal jurisdicition 
over various and sundry criminal offenses. Jurisdiction of lay justices in 
Utah extends over such misdemeanors as petty theft, assault and battery, 
breach of the peace and all misdemeanors involving up to a $300 fine or 
six (6) months imprisonment or both. Section 78-5-4- Utah Code Annotated 
(1953). 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel 
at trial extends to all indigent criminally accused facing a jail sentence. 
Argersinger v. Hamlin. The fundamental character of this right was 
reiterated by giving the Argersinger decision full retroactive effect in Berry 
v. City of Cincinnatti, 414 U. S. 29 (1973). However, the right to counsel is 
rendered illusory where counsel must argue before a judge who is not 
adequately trained in the law. If a judge is not able to rely on his own 
knowledge of the legal merit of counsel's argument, he is apt to trust the 
counsel of the lawyer that he is most familiar with, as he lacks an independent 
standard by which to judge. This becomes the Mrule by fiat" denounced by 
Dean Pound. 
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A notable example of who the non-lawyer judge will turn to when a 
problem arises finds startling effect in Utah. The means provided by the 
State of Utah to shield the justices from legal error resulting from their 
lack of learning in the law is a Manual for Justices of the Peace in the State of 
Utah prepared by Brigitte M. Bodenheimer in 1956. This manual is today 
hopelessly outdated and affirmatively misleading. ° The non-law trained 
judge faced with a question of law and no means or ability to resolve it 
is likely to rely heavily on the representations of the County Attorney. The 
manual expressly approves this practice. On page 14 the following advice 
appears: 
There will no doubt be many occasions, however, when the 
answer to his problem cannot be found in this book. In such a 
case it is recommended that the justice get in touch with the county 
attorney of his county who is the legal advisor of the county's 
precinct officers. 
Again at page 59 the manual notes: 
The defendant is often not represented by counsel in a justice 
court. County attorneys are accustomed to that fact and are 
generally able to play the role of both prosecutor and defense 
attorney with fairness to both sides. (Emphasis Supplied). 
8. This manual, we are told, is in the process of being revised and brought 
up to date. 
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At page 71, The Justice of the Peace is given advice on instructing the 
jury: 
Sometimes after the justice has finished his instructions to the 
juiy, one or both attorneys may ask him to add further charges 
to the jury, which the attorney reads to him. The justice then 
says: fI so charge' or TI refuse to so charge.' If he is in doubt 
on how to rule, the county attorney, if present, will generally 
come to his aid. (Emphasis Supplied). 
The effect of this advice in the official Manual is to invite the 
"neutral" judge to defer, when in doubt, to the decision of one of the liti-
gant's counsel. The right to a decision by an impartial tribunal is denied 
in fact whenever the untrained judge is called upon to decide a question of 
law without the knowledge or training to decide it: in that situation he is 
officially advised to rely upon the prosecutor! Defendant's right to be heard 
in his own defense b ecomes his right to be heard by opposing counsel. 
A judge who has been a lawyer is in the habit of reading the advance 
sheets containing state appellate and United States Supreme Court cases as well 
as law review articles. A layman is not likely to be learned in such complex 
matters as the rules of evidence. The difficulty of the subject matter 
of a criminal case is nowhere better exemplified than in the Utah Rules of 
Evidence where the Hearsay Rule, Rule 63, for example, takes up some 
21 pages embodying the Rule itself and the numerous exceptions to the Rule. 
Other examples become obvious from an even cursory perusal of Volume 
Eight of the Utah Code Annotated which contains the criminal code and code 
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of criminal procedure. y 
The proper resolution of complex legal problems is often 
crucial to the outcome of cases within the justice's jurisdiction. Since the 
decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1966), extending the Fourth 
Amendment's exclusionary rule to the states, the United States Supreme 
Court alone has decided literally hundreds of cases affecting the criminal 
trial process. These cases affect such interests, to name only a few, 
as: the right to be free from unreasonable search and se izures ,^ the 
prohibition against double jeopardy;11 the prohibition against self-
9. Exemplifying this point in the cases of the respondent's are several recent 
decisions of this Court involving the offense of driving under the influence 
which presented difficult evidentiary issues and problems of statutory 
construction. Section 41-6-44 Utah Code Annotated (1953). See eg. Gibb v. 
Dorius, Utah, 533 P. 2d 299 (1975) (holding that only one acting under the 
direction and or supervision of a licensed physician may withdraw blood from 
one suspected of driving while under the influence); Wells v. City Court of 
Logan City, Utah, 535 P. 2d 683 (1975) (person arrested for drunk driving 
shall be immediately taken to a magistrate who is nearest to the place where 
the arrest is made). Greaves v. State, Utah 528 P. 2d 805 (1974) (upholding 
Sections 41-6-12, 41-6-44.2 Utah Code Annotated (1953) making it unlawful 
for anyone with blood alcohol content of . 10 per cent or greater to drive or 
be in actual control of any vehicle against void for vagueness claim); and 
McCallv. Dorius, Utah; 527 P. 2d 647 (1947) (Construing implied consent 
statute and propriety of revocation of driving license). Cf. State v. Cruz, 
21 U. 2d 406, 446 P. 2d 307 (1968) (Discussing implied consent law in Utah). 
10. Chimelv. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (limitations on "search 
incident to arrest);" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971) ("the 
plain view theory"); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963) (the 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine); SpfoeUi v. United States, 393 U. S. 
410 (1968) (search warrant affidavits). Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 
757 (1966) (seizure of person's blood for purposes of blood alcohol test) c 
11. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970) (collateral estoppel doctrine). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 13 14 
incrimination, the admissability of confessions; the right to a "fairM 
15 16 
and speedy public trial, including a jury of one's peers, the right to 
* 17 18 
confrontation and cross-examination; the right to counsel; and fair 
19 
treatment in sentencing. 
As stated by the editors of the Criminal Law Reporter. 
From the 1960-61 term through the 1968-69 term, with the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a lever, nearly all the guarantees 
of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments have been made 
binding upon the states. At the same time, numerous U. S. 
Supreme Court decisions have strengthened these guarantees. 
The court's extension of the mantle of federal protections to 
persons accused in State criminal proceedings and its bolstering 
of these protections have brought about dramatic changes in the 
criminal law. 
12. Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 436 (1965) (barring comment on 
failure to testify). 
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 386 U. S. 436 (1966) (procedural protections 
afforded during custodial interrogation); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964) 
(determination of "voluntariness" of confessions). 
14. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374 (1969) (unrelated incarceration does 
not abrogate right). 
15. Walster v. California, 394 U. S. 440 (1969) (the "totality of the 
circumstances" test for due process). 
16. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970) (sixth amendment right 
to jury trial in misdemeanors). 
17. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965) (invalidating use of prior 
testimony without opportunity for cross-examination). 
18. Argersinger v. Hamlin , 407 U. S. 67 (1972) (right to counsel in 
misdemeanors). 
19. Tate V. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971) (bars conversion of fine to 
imprisonment); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969) (waiving 
of rights in guilty pleas). 
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It is safe to predict that changes in the criminal law will continue to 
be a source of increasing complexity and controversy in the criminal process. 
Moreover, resolution of cases within the jurisdiction of inferior courts 
requires not only ability to understand a highly complex, controversial and 
changing body of law, but also the ability to disregard the truthfulness and 
probative value of illegally obtained evidence which has been heard in its 
full and potentially incriminating detail. Because of the inability of the lay 
person to segregate the issue of truthfulness from the issue of admissibility 
and the issues of admissibility from the issue of guilt, the responsibility 
for making these determinationscannot constitutionally be delegatedto a jury. 2( 
Thus, the presence of defense counsel in court, his presentation of 
evidence, and his arguement about the legal standards and matters of evidence 
is apt to fall upon deaf ears where the judge lacks an independent standard 
to apply. Since arguments based upon recent cases decided by the United 
States Supreme Court and this Court in areas of constitutional law, as 
well as simple evidentiary matters, may not be comprehended by the lay 
judge, the constitutional guarantee of due process cannot be accorded the 
20. Jackson v. Denno 378 U. S. 368 (1964) (procedure that leaves the factual 
determination of the voluntariness of a confession to the jury held to be 
invalid in view of the confession either in determining admissibility or in 
determining guilt ) and Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968) (co-
defendant's confession inculpating the defeiidart cannot be used in a joint 
trial even if jury specifically instructed that confession was admissible 
only against the declarant). 
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defendant. ^ Due process of law requires not only that a person exercising 
a judicial function be fair and impartial but also that he be competent. The 
wisdom of the words of Justice Sutherland speaking for the Court in Powell 
v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 69 (1932) decided over forty years ago are 
apposite in the instant case: 
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes 
no skill in the science of the law. If charged with crime, he is 
incapable generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment 
is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left 
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper 
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence 
irrelevant to the issue or other wise inadmissible. He lacks both 
the skill and the knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, 
even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand 
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without 
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction 
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that 
be true of men of intelligence, how much, more true is it of the 
ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. 
The right to counsel at trial is equally as important to the preservation 
of justice in misdemeanors as in felony proceedings. Argersinger v. Hamlin 
supra. As Chief Justice Burger observed, concurring in Argersinger: 
[A]ny deprivation of liberty is a serious matter. The issues 
that must be dealt with in a trial for a petty offense or a mis-
demeanor may often be simpler than those involved in a felony trial 
and yet be beyond the capability of a layman, especially when he is 
opposed by a law-trained prosecutor. There is little ground, 
21. Alexander Hamilton noted this proHem long ago, in a different context, 
stating that "Laws are a dead letter, without courts to expound and define 
their meaning and operation.Tt Federalist'Papers No. 15 as quoted in Hart 
and WechslerTs, The Federal Courts and the Federal System (2d ed.~ 1973) 
at 24. 
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therefore, to assume that a defendant unaided by counsel, 
will be any more able adequately to defend himself against 
the lesser charges that may involve confinement than more 
serious charges. Appeal from a conviction after an uncounseled 
trial is not likely to be of much help to a defendant since the die 
is usually cast when judgment is entered on an uncounseled 
trial record. (407 U. S. at 41). 
It is clear, therefore, that justice of the peace courts cannot find 
justification from the fact that lay judges in justice courts are limited to 
trials of misdemeanors carrying a maximum penalty of six months 
imprisonment as is the case in Utah. The distinction between so-called 
"petty" and "serious" offenses has been expressly limited to the right 
to jury trial (by reason of the unique legal history of the jury) and has 
been notably rejected as inaaplicable to other due process rights in 
29 
misdemeanor cases. 
For the same reasons a lay person can no longer be considered 
competent to preside over the criminal trials were a jail sentence may 
result within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts of Utah. 
The right to counsel in these cases necessarily includes the right to a 
competent law trained tribunal to hear counsel. To conclude otherwise 
is to continue a system which requires that indigent criminal defendants 
must be provided with counsel who are attorneys but not that they must be 
provided with judges who are attorneys. This conclusion posits that the 
22. In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948) (right to public trial); Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965) (right to confrontation); Washington v. Texas, 
388 U. S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process to secure attendance of 
witnesses); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937) (right 
to cross-examine). 
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role of the judge who must decide or preside over a criminal case is less 
crucial and less constitutionally significant than the role of the counsel 
who must argue it. Respondents submit that this cannot be so. 
The California Court's, obvious reliance on Argersinger in 
Gordon v. Justice Court, lends credence to this assertion, and it is 
respectfully submitted that the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel as 
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment demands not only 
counsel at the side of the accused, but an attorney-judge presiding over 
the trial who is able to adequately respond to counsel when imprisonment 
may result from the charge. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The practice of allowing lay judges to try cases that affect the 
liberty of the accused violates the constitutional rights of those against 
whom, by an accident of geography, a complaint is filed in areas where a 
lay judge is sitting. The unfamiliarity of lay judges with constitutional 
law and criminal law and procedure necessarily results in such a lack 
of adherence to the legal precedents which are applied in other courts that 
the accused are deprived due process of law and equal protection as required 
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In addition, 
the barrier to defense counsel's communication with an untrained judge 
as to the rules and legal nuances governing the defendant's rights, results 
in a de facto deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as made 
applicable to the States by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although large numbers of persons each year receive their first impressions 
of the American System of Criminal Justice in courts where non-lawyer judges Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
preside, these courts, by and large, fail to meet professional standards 
of criminal law and procedure. Finally, the development of modern 
means of transportation and communication and availability of sufficient 
numbers of professionally trained personnel, coupled with the current 
trend away from lay judge courts, should result in the discarding as a 
violation of due process of law such anantiquated system which was utilized 
as an expedient to meet Eighteenth Century, not Twentitieth Century, conditions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
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